Strait of Hormuz and the strategic calculus of Iran's deterrence doctrine

TEHRAN – For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has remained one of the most sensitive geopolitical chokepoints in the world. This narrow waterway, which links the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and extends beyond to international waters, serves not only as a major artery for global energy flows but also as a flashpoint for regional and international security dynamics.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), more than 20 million barrels of crude oil pass through the strait each day, accounting for approximately one-fifth of global oil trade. It is also a key conduit for liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments, further enhancing its strategic importance.
Yet the significance of Hormuz transcends oil flows. As tensions rise between Iran and Western-aligned powers—particularly with continued Israeli military activities targeting Iranian assets in Syria, Lebanon, and even within Iranian territory itself, coupled with U.S. military build-up in the region—Tehran has consistently warned that no act of aggression will go unanswered. One of the strategic options frequently cited in both official and unofficial channels is Iran’s ability to disrupt or suspend maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz as part of a calibrated deterrence or retaliatory response.
Contrary to some portrayals in Western media, Iran is neither a fragile state nor a loosely organized militia actor. It is a sovereign nation of over 89 million people with a vast territorial expanse, more than four decades of post-revolutionary institutional resilience, and an increasingly sophisticated indigenous defense industry. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Iran possesses one of the region’s most robust missile programs, with operational ranges exceeding 2,000 kilometers. The Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy has developed asymmetric naval capabilities—including fast attack craft, sea mines, and coastal missile systems—that allow Iran to contest maritime superiority in the Persian Gulf.
Iran's military doctrine centers on the concept of “active defense”—a commitment to avoid initiating war while retaining the capacity for rapid, multilayered, and proportionate response to aggression. This principle is rooted in historical experience, especially the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), which saw Iran repelling a full-scale invasion with minimal international support, while ultimately preserving its territorial integrity despite massive casualties and economic hardship.
Iran’s threats to disrupt traffic through the Strait of Hormuz should not be dismissed as irrational brinkmanship. In strategic literature, the use of geopolitical chokepoints as leverage is a recognized and often utilized deterrent tool. Tehran has stated repeatedly that it will honor its international commitments as long as its sovereignty and rights under international law are respected. However, in the face of a direct military attack by the U.S., Israel, or other actors, Iran may resort to asymmetric measures—of which Hormuz remains a central node—in order to shift the strategic equation.
From a legal standpoint, the right to restrict or suspend innocent passage through territorial waters is recognized under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 25 of the convention allows coastal states to regulate transit for security reasons, while Article 51 of the UN Charter explicitly affirms the right to self-defense in the event of armed attack. Therefore, any Iranian measure to limit passage through Hormuz in response to a foreign military incursion could be interpreted not as a violation of international norms but as a lawful act of collective self-defense.
Importantly, Iran does not require large-scale kinetic action to disrupt shipping through the strait. Even the hint of hostilities or a limited skirmish in the vicinity can cause insurance premiums to spike, reroute cargo traffic, and send oil prices soaring. For instance, following attacks on two oil tankers near the strait in 2019, global crude prices surged by over 10%, according to World Bank assessments.
A disruption of traffic through the Strait of Hormuz would have immediate ramifications for major energy importers. Countries like China, India, South Korea, and Japan rely heavily on crude oil that transits the strait. Even oil-exporting nations such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait would suffer significant losses, as their seaborne exports predominantly depend on access through Hormuz. The ripple effects would reach global shipping lines, insurance providers, and international financial markets, each highly vulnerable to disruptions in maritime flow.
Beyond economics, the closure or militarization of the Strait of Hormuz would stress existing regional alliances. The U.S. currently maintains military bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and the UAE. In the event of a major escalation, domestic political pressure within these host countries may rise to reassess their alignment, or at the very least, demand a more neutral posture. A full-scale American military intervention to forcibly reopen the strait would drastically raise the risk of region-wide conflict—an outcome that few, if any, stakeholders would welcome amid ongoing global economic instability.
It is also worth noting that Iran has, on several occasions, proposed regional cooperation initiatives aimed at reducing tensions and fostering collective security. The most notable among them is the Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE), introduced by Tehran as a framework for Persian Gulf security based on non-aggression, mutual respect, and the exclusion of foreign military powers. However, these overtures have often been sidelined, as Israeli sabotage operations, targeted assassinations, and clandestine strikes against Iranian interests have continued unabated, with tacit Western support or silence.
In this context, Iran’s deterrence messaging—including the credible threat of closing or disrupting Hormuz—is not driven by adventurism but by a calculated awareness of its strategic leverage. The Islamic Republic is not a rogue actor; it is a structured state with institutional depth, popular support, and an evolving deterrent posture designed to raise the cost of aggression. Its adversaries should not assume that targeted airstrikes, covert operations, or economic warfare will go unanswered. Any direct assault on Iranian territory—whether through Israeli proxy attacks or an overt U.S. campaign—risks triggering a range of asymmetric responses, with the Strait of Hormuz as one of the most consequential theaters.
In conclusion, the international community must recognize that security is not a one-way street. No nation, regardless of power, can expect immunity from consequences when it violates another’s sovereignty. The Strait of Hormuz remains not only a vital channel for the global energy market but also a symbol of Iran’s strategic depth. Should Iran’s territorial integrity or political sovereignty come under attack, the repercussions will reverberate far beyond its borders—and no waterway, however essential, will remain untouched.
Leave a Comment